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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joseph Luther Jacobs pleaded guilty to one count of felony robbery, and the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. 
Mr. Jacobs filed an untimely notice of appeal. He also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the district court denied. 
Mr. Jacobs subsequently began the present post-conviction proceeding. The 
district court rejected Mr. Jacobs' assertions that there had been ineffective assistance 
of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental health 
evaluation, and that he was entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence that would require vacation of the sentence in the interest of 
justice. Thus, the district court summarily dismissed, with prejudice, Count One of 
Mr. Jacobs' amended petition for post-conviction relief. The parties then stipulated that 
there was good cause to grant Mr. Jacobs relief on Count Two of the amended petition 
(which asserted that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial 
counsel did not file a timely appeal as Mr. Jacobs wanted). The district court held that 
Mr. Jacobs was entitled to reentry of judgment in the underlying criminal case and to file 
a timely appeal in that case. 
Mr. Jacobs appealed, asserting that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing with prejudice Count One of the amended petition because he presented 
prima facie evidence that newly discovered evidence required vacation of the sentence 
in the interest of justice, as well as prima facie evidence that there had been ineffective 
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assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental 
health evaluation. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Jacobs waived his newly 
discovered evidence assertion on appeal because he did not provided the legal 
argument necessary to support that assertion, and that Mr. Jacobs did not show any 
error in the district court's summary dismissal of his assertion that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the mental health evaluation, in part because the ICC 
mental health assessments did not provide any new information. (Resp. Br., pp.7-12.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments that Mr. Jacobs 
waived his newly discovered evidence assertion on appeal, and that the ICC mental 
health assessments did not provide any new information. Mr. Jacobs has not waived 
his newly discovered evidence assertion on appeal, because he presented argument 
and authority sufficient to support that assertion. The legal argument the State 
contends is "necessary to support" that assertion is irrelevant where, as in this case, a 
petitioner has requested vacation of a sentence as post-conviction relief. Further, 
contrary to the State's argument, the ICC mental health assessments provided 
new evidence. 
Mr. Jacobs challenges the State's broader argument that he did not present 
prima facie evidence that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental health evaluation, but he relies on the 
arguments contained in his Appellant's Brief on that point and will not repeat 
them herein. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Jacobs' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
3 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed, with prejudice, Count One of 
Mr. Jacobs' amended petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed, With Prejudice, Count One Of 
Mr. Jacobs' Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Jacobs asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed, with 
prejudice, Count One of the amended petition, because he presented prima facie 
evidence that newly discovered evidence required the vacation of the sentence in the 
interest of justice, as well as prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel 
on the basis of his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental 
health evaluation. 
B. Mr. Jacobs Presented Prima Facie Evidence That Newly Discovered Evidence 
Required Vacation Of The Sentence In The Interest Of Justice 
Mr. Jacobs asserts that he presented prima facie evidence that newly discovered 
evidence required vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice. The ICC mental 
health assessments completed after sentencing raise a genuine issue of material fact 
sufficient to survive summary dismissal, because they set forth evidence of material 
facts that would require vacation of his sentence under I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4). 
Rather than make a substantive argument on the merits regarding this assertion 
(see Resp. Br., pp.7-12), the State argues that Mr. Jacobs "has waived his newly 
discovered evidence claim on appeal, and this Court should not consider it." (Resp. 
Br., p.7 n.3 (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).) According to the State, 
Mr. Jacobs waived the newly discovered evidence assertion through not "provid[ing] the 
legal argument necessary to support his claim," because he has not addressed "the 
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Drapeau four-factor test."1 (Resp. Br., p.7 n.3.) As the Idaho Supreme Court held in 
Zichko, "When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or 
argument, they will not be considered." Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. "A party waives an 
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking." Id. 
Mr. Jacobs has not waived his newly discovered evidence assertion on appeal, 
because he presented argument and authority sufficient to support that assertion. 
Where (as in this case) a petitioner requests the vacation of a sentence in a post-
conviction proceeding based on newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must show 
"that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that 
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." See I.C. § 19-
4901 (a)(4); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 437, 440 (Ct. App. 2007). "An applicant 
must prevent evidence of facts that existed at the time of sentencing that would have 
been relevant to the sentencing process and that indicate the information available to 
the parties or the trial court at the time of sentencing was false, incomplete, or otherwise 
materially misleading." Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440. 
Here, Mr. Jacobs asserted that the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
with prejudice Count One of the amended petition, because he presented prima facie 
evidence that newly discovered evidence required vacation of the sentence in the 
1 The test from State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976), provides that, in the context of 
motions for a new trial: 
A motion based on newly discovered evidence must disclose (1) that the 
evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the 
time of trial; (2) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or 
impeaching; (3) that it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that 
failure to learn of the evidence was due in no part to lack of diligence on 
the part of the defendant. 
Id. at 691. 
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interest of justice. (App. Br., pp.12-13.) As required by Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 
Mr. Jacobs supported this assertion with authority and argument in the Appellant's Brief 
regarding the showing he had to make pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4) and Knutsen. 
(See App. Br., pp.13-16.) 
Contrary to the State's argument, Mr. Jacobs has not waived his newly 
discovered evidence assertion on appeal. The legal argument the State contends is 
"necessary to support" that assertion is irrelevant where a petitioner has requested 
vacation of a sentence as post-conviction relief. Although the State alleges that a 
defendant "must satisfy" the Drapeau test "in order to be entitled to relief based upon a 
post-conviction claim of newly discovered evidence" (Resp. Br., p.7 n.3), the Drapeau 
test actually applies only where a petitioner requests a new trial in a post-conviction 
proceeding based on newly discovered evidence. In Whiteley v. State, 131 Idaho 323 
(1998), a case cited by the State (Resp. Br., p.7 n.3), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that "the request for a new trial in a post-conviction proceeding based on newly 
discovered evidence is the same as a motion for new trial subsequent to a jury verdict. 
Before a new trial can be granted, and irrespective of the form of the request, new 
evidence must satisfy the four-part test set forth in [Drapeau]." Whiteley, 131 Idaho at 
326 (internal citation omitted). 
The Drapeau test for new trial motions, rather than being "necessary to support" 
Mr. Jacobs' newly discovered evidence assertion, is irrelevant to his assertion. Instead 
of requesting a new trial, Mr.Jacobs requested the vacation of his sentence. (See 
Confidential Exs., p.7; see also R., p.8.) Thus, rather than needing to address the 
Drapeau test, Mr. Jacobs had to address whether "there exists evidence of material 
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facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or 
sentence in the interest of justice." See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440. As discussed 
above, Mr. Jacobs addressed that point through presenting authority and argument in 
the Appellant's Brief. (See App. Br., pp.13-16.) Further, the State has made no effort to 
explain how Mr. Jacobs could have requested a new trial as post-conviction relief, 
considering he pleaded guilty through a plea agreement and therefore did not even 
have a trial in the underlying case. (See Confidential Exs., pp.2-3; R., pp.51-52.) Thus, 
Mr. Jacobs has not waived his newly discovered evidence assertion on appeal. 
In the Respondent's Brief, the State did not present any substantive arguments 
on the merits to counter Mr. Jacobs' newly discovered evidence assertion. ( See Resp. 
Br., pp.7-12.) As shown in the Appellant's Brief (App Br., pp.13-16), Mr. Jacobs 
presented prima facie evidence that newly discovered evidence required vacation of the 
sentence in the interest of justice. The district court's order summarily dismissing Count 
One of the amended petition should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for 
an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Jacobs is entitled to resentencing in light of the 
ICC mental health assessments. 
C. Mr. Jacobs Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of The Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel Based On His Trial Counsel's Failure To Challenge The Original Mental 
Health Evaluation 
Mr. Jacobs asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental 
health evaluation, because he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his 
trial counsel's failure was objectively unreasonable, and as to whether he was 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure. 
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The State has adopted the district court's reasoning for why the failure to 
challenge the original mental health evaluation was properly summarily dismissed 
(Resp. Br., p.10), which Mr. Jacobs has already addressed in the Appellant's Brief. 
(App. Br., pp.16-19.) Further, the State argues that Mr. Jacobs has not shown "any 
error in [the] district court's summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim," because the ICC mental health assessments "did not provide any information 
the district court did not have before it at [Mr.] Jacobs' sentencing hearing." (Resp. 
Br., p.12.) However, the ICC mental health assessments provided new evidence. 
The original mental health evaluation reported that Mr. Jacobs began to struggle 
"with a low mood in February, 2011 .... During this time period [Mr. Jacobs] identified 
he was sad, hopeless, and felt out of control." (Confidential Exs., pp.26, 29.) The State 
argues that "feeling 'out of control,' especially combined with feeling sad and hopeless, 
denotes the possibility that a person's judgment has been impacted and compromised." 
(Resp. Br., p.12.) The State also contends the original mental health evaluation's 
statement that "[a]t that time Mr. Jacobs could have met DSM-IV criteria for adjustment 
Disorder with Depressed Mood" (Confidential Exs., p.29), "informed the court all the 
more that [Mr.] Jacobs' judgment may well have been impacted by his 'psychosocial 
stressors."' (Resp. Br., p.12.) 
The State essentially argues that the ICC mental health assessments did not 
provide any new evidence, because the district court could have inferred from the 
original mental health evaluation that Mr. Jacobs' judgment could have been impacted 
and compromised by his psychological stressors. However, this argument obscures the 
difference between evidence and inferences from that evidence. See also State v. 
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Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 216 (Ct. App. 1997) (observing, in the context of search warrant 
affidavits, that "[t]he magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the 
evidence presented.") "Evidence" is defined as, "Something ... that tends to prove or 
disprove the existence of an alleged fact." Evidence, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 
2009). "Inference" is defined as, "A conclusion reached by considering other facts and 
deducing a logical consequence from them," and as "The process by which such a 
conclusion is reached; the process of thought by which one moves from evidence to 
proof." Inference, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
Even assuming that the district court could-and did-conclude from the original 
mental health evaluation that Mr. Jacobs' judgment could have been impacted and 
compromised by his psychosocial stressors, the district court's conclusion would have 
been an inference, not evidence. The only way the original mental health evaluation 
would have "denoted" or "informed the court" of the possibility that Mr. Jacobs' judgment 
could have been impacted and compromised (see Resp. Br., p.12), would have been 
through the district court reaching that conclusion "by considering other facts and 
deducing a logical consequence from them." See Inference, Black's Law Dictionary. In 
other words, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Jacobs' judgment could have been 
impacted and compromised, if it were drawn from the original mental health evaluation, 
would have been an inference, not evidence. 
Contrary to the State's argument, the ICC mental health assessments provided 
new evidence. The ICC mental health assessments expressly report that "it is possible 
that [Mr. Jacobs'] judgment could have been impacted [and] compromised in a 
homeless [and] unsteady environment." (Confidential Exs., p.60.) That report is 
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evidence, because it "tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact." See 
Evidence, Black's Law Dictionary. Further, the original mental health evaluation (and 
the presentence report) did not present any evidence that Mr. Jacobs' psychological 
stressors could have impacted and compromised his judgment. (See Confidential Exs., 
pp.10-19, 26-32.) 
In sum, the ICC mental health assessments provided new evidence. That new 
evidence would have served as an important mitigating factor for Mr. Jacobs' sentence. 
Thus, as shown in the Appellant's Brief (App. Br., pp.16-18), Mr. Jacobs presented 
prima facie evidence of the ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's 
failure to challenge the original mental health evaluation. The district court's order 
summarily dismissing Count One should be reversed, and the case should be 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Jacobs is entitled to resentencing 
in light of his trial counsel's ineffective assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, and the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Jacobs respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
summary dismissing, with prejudice, Count One of his amended petition for post-
conviction relief, and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Jacobs 
is entitled to resentencing. 
DATED this 11 th day of February, 2014. 
?!? ~ -~---
BEN P. MCGRE~~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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